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Despite improvements 
over the years, capital 
regulation failed to 
ensure stability of the 
financial system in the 
crisis that flared in the 
summer of 2007.
Seeking Stability: What’s Next 
for Banking Regulation? 
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rules on bank capital have been a key element of banking regulation 
for many years. The Basel Capital accord of 1988, known as Basel i, established 
a common framework to measure capital and set minimum standards for inter-
national banks. one of the main goals was to ensure the soundness and stability 
of the international banking system.1 
Currently, many countries are adopting a revised framework, known 
as Basel ii.2 The new accord refines Basel i’s crude measure of bank capital and 
adds rules on bank supervision and transparency.
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many institutions. 
Some banks heavily reliant on 
short-term funding, such as Britain’s 
Northern Rock, experienced runs. 
Others found themselves with a need 
to replenish rapidly deteriorating 
capital positions. All in all, the recent 
events underscore the need for further 
revisions in banking regulation.
The Two Basel Accords 
The regulation of bank capital 
aims to ensure bank solvency and 
reduce costs associated with bank 
defaults. Bank failures have systemic 
costs that lead to financial system dis-
ruptions and losses not fully borne by 
failing institutions. Forcing banks to 
hold adequate capital reduces these 
losses. Of course, there’s a tradeoff: 
Very high levels of regulatory capital 
diminish bank lending. Thus, capital 
regulation’s goal is to protect the sys-
tem against default costs while promot-
ing healthy bank lending.
In practice, calculations of mini-
mum regulatory capital are based on 
the credit risk of bank assets. The 
guidelines formulated by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision call 
for a bank to hold capital of at least 
8 percent of the total value of assets 
adjusted for individual risk. 
One of Basel I’s shortcomings 
was that assets were grouped in 
very coarse risk categories, so banks’ 
regulatory measure of risk could differ 
substantially from their actual risk. For 
example, all business loans received 
the same weight, despite large differ-
ences in risk among borrowers. As 
a result, the Basel committee revised 
the accord in June 2004. The major 
change, introduced by Basel II, was 
a more risk-sensitive measure of 
capital (see box,“Calculating Capital 
Requirements”). 
While Basel II improves on some 
aspects of Basel I, it still raises some of 
the same concerns. 
First, the potential to mismeasure 
risk remains. The new rules for credit 
risk work well only insofar as the 
estimates produced by banks’ internal 
Calculating Capital Requirements
Capital  has  two  components.  Tier  1—or  core  capital—consists  of  equity  capital, 
such as common stock, and disclosed reserves, such as those from retained earnings. 
Tier 2—or supplementary capital—includes elements like perpetual cumulative preferred 
shares  and  subordinated  debt  with  maturity  greater  than  five  years.  Under  the  Basel 
accords, total capital must be at least 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. Core capital must 
be at least half of that.1
Under Basel I … 
In computing risk-weighted assets, the assets and off-balance-sheet activities of a 
bank are grouped into four categories that reflect the degree of credit risk—zero, 20, 50 or 
100 percent. Cash or claims on central banks denominated in national currency are con-
sidered virtually risk free and given a weight of zero. Loans fully secured by a mortgage on 
residential property have a weight of 50 percent. All business loans are given a weight of 
100 percent, even though risk varies greatly depending on the borrower.
 Off-balance-sheet items are first converted into on-balance-sheet items using credit 
conversion factors and then receive an appropriate risk weight.
Under Basel II … 
An asset’s credit risk is calculated using one of two approaches. The standardized 
approach bases risk weights on ratings by external agencies. The internal-ratings-based 
(IRB) approach has two versions, both of which use several parameters to measure risk 
weights. Main parameters include the probability of default, the loss given default, the 
exposure at default and the maturity of the asset. 
Banks that operate under the “foundation” version of the IRB approach compute their 
own estimate for the probability of default, while the other three parameters are set by 
the Basel committee. Banks that operate under the “advanced” version estimate the four 
parameters according to their own internal models.
Basel II introduces a more refined measure of credit risk. For example, risk weights for 
residential mortgages under the IRB approach vary greatly (see table).
IRB Risk Weights for Residential Mortgages
Probability of default (percent) Risk weight (percent)
  .03   4.15
  .25   21.30
  .50   35.08
  1.00   56.40
  2.50   100.64
  5.00   148.22
  10.00   204.41
  20.00   253.12
NOTE: The risk weights are computed for loss given default of 45 percent. 
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, June 2006.
1 Under Basel II, banks may also employ a third tier of capital at the discretion of their national authority, 
consisting of short-term subordinated debt. For details, see “International Convergence of Capital Mea-
surement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, Comprehensive Version,” Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland, June 2006.  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter 3
Routine links between 
institutions create risks that 
aren’t addressed by capital 
regulations. In the current 
financial crisis, the fate of 
a British bank made this 
quite clear.
models accurately reflect underlying 
risks. Problems may appear, for exam-
ple, in evaluating new assets for which 
little reliable historical data exist. 
A second concern is that capital 
requirements exacerbate macroeco-
nomic fluctuations. In a downturn, 
a bank’s capital is likely to deterio-
rate due to loan losses. At the same 
time, the bank’s nondefaulting bor-
rowers are likely to be downgraded, 
forcing the bank to hold more capi-
tal against its now riskier loan port-
folio. If the bank is unable to raise 
more equity—as is often the case 
in a downturn—it will have to limit 
lending, worsening already adverse 
economic conditions.
Third and most important, risk-
based capital regulation may be inad-
equate for protecting the financial 
system. Capital requirements may pro-
mote stability of individual institutions. 
However, ensuring each bank’s stabil-
ity doesn’t necessarily guarantee the 
stability of the system as a whole. 
A simple example shows how 
prudent action by one financial 
institution may undermine another.3 
Suppose Bank 1 borrows from Bank 
2. Bank 2 has other loans on its books 
and suffers losses on them. Its capital 
reduced, Bank 2 decides to curtail its 
lending to Bank 1, even though Bank 
1 is a creditworthy borrower. 
Bank 2’s reduction in lending rep-
resents a prudent move that strength-
ens its capital position. From Bank 
1’s point of view, however, Bank 
2’s action amounts to a withdrawal 
of lending. Bank 1 will need to find 
an alternative source of funding or 
reduce its asset holdings. If Bank 1 
holds illiquid assets and doesn’t obtain 
new lending, Bank 2’s reduction in 
lending will feel like a run for Bank 1 
(see box, “Capital Regulation: A System 
Perspective, page 4). 
This example illustrates that rou-
tine links between institutions create 
risks that aren’t addressed by capital 
regulations. In the current financial 
crisis, the fate of a British bank made 
this quite clear.
The Run on Northern Rock
U.K. mortgage lender Northern 
Rock, the first bank to fail in the cur-
rent crisis, faced a run similar to that of 
Bank 1 in the example.4 As the short-
term and interbank lending markets 
froze in mid-2007, Northern Rock ran 
into funding problems, even though it 
had virtually no subprime lending.
On July 25, 2007, Northern Rock 
published its interim report for the 
year. The chief executive acknowl-
edged that annual profits would be 
affected by recent sharp increases in 
money market borrowing rates but 
concluded that “the medium term out-
look for the Company is very positive.” 
On Sept. 14, the Bank of England 
granted emergency liquidity support to 
Northern Rock. This was the first run 
on a U.K. bank since 1866. Northern 
Rock was taken into public ownership 
in February 2008.
What went wrong during those 
two months in 2007, and why did it 
lead to Northern Rock’s fall?5 In short, 
troubles with U.S. subprime mortgages 
led to sharp increases in spreads on 
asset-backed securities that summer, 
causing a worldwide liquidity freeze in 
short-term markets. 
Entities that had relied on these 
markets for funding, such as structured 
investment vehicles, ended up tap-
ping their bank lines of credit. In turn, 
banks began to hoard liquidity due 
to uncertainty about future liquidity 
needs, causing a freeze in the whole-
sale markets. Northern Rock was vul-
nerable because it had relied heavily 
on wholesale funds.6
Northern Rock engaged primar-
ily in residential lending in the U.K. 
From 1998 until June 2007, the bank 
expanded its balance sheet aggres-
sively and became Britain’s fifth-largest 
mortgage lender. Total assets increased 
from £17.4 billion to £113.5 billion. 
This growth was accompanied by a 
reduction in retail deposits from 60 
percent of total liabilities to 21 percent. 
By June 2007, most of Northern 
Rock’s funding came from securitized 
notes, wholesale markets and other   EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 4   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
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Capital Regulation: A System Perspective
The  balance  sheets  provide  simple  illustrations  of  the 
assets and liabilities of two banks (right). Both banks need 
to comply with a capital-requirement ratio of 8 percent and a 
reserve-requirement ratio of 10 percent.
If reserves carry a risk weight of zero and all loans carry a 
risk weight of 1, both banks have risk-weighted assets equal 
to $91. Their capital ratios are $10/$91, about 11 percent. 
Moreover,  the  banks  hold  $1  of  reserves  for  each  $10  of 
deposits, so the reserve ratio is met as well.
Bank 1
Assets Liabilities
Reserves $9 Deposit from Bank 2 $30
Loans $91 Other deposits $60
Equity $10
Total $100 Total $100
Bank 2
Assets Liabilities
Reserves $9 Deposits $90
Loan to Bank 1 $30 Equity $10
Other loans $61
Total $100 Total $100
Suppose that Bank 2 suffers a credit loss of $2.50 on its 
loans to customers other than Bank 1. Bank 2’s equity capital 
is reduced to $7.50 and total assets now equal $97.50. If the 
risk  weight  for  all  nondefaulted  loans  remains  unchanged, 
Bank  2’s  capital  ratio  declines  to  $7.50/$88.50,  about  8.5 
percent.
To strengthen its capital position, Bank 2 decides to renew 
only three-fourths of the loan it made to Bank 1 and to hold 
excess reserves. The new balance sheet of Bank 2 shows that 
the capital ratio is 9.3 percent and the reserve ratio is 18.3 
percent (right).
 Bank 2 took a cautious action and strengthened its books. 
From the perspective of Bank 1, however, the reduction in 
Bank 2’s lending is a withdrawal of funds.
Bank  1  has  a  problem:  Its  reserves  are  depleted,  and 
it has to either find funding elsewhere or reduce its assets 
(right). If Bank 1’s loans are illiquid—for example, residential 
mortgages—and  the  bank  can’t  find  alternative  sources  of 
funds, the withdrawal of funds will feel like a run. 
Bank 1
Assets Liabilities
Reserves $1.5 Deposit from Bank 2 $22.5
Loans $91.0 Other deposits $60.0
Equity $10.0
Total $92.5 Total $92.5
Bank 2
Assets Liabilities
Reserves $16.5 Deposits $90.0
Loan to Bank 1 $22.5 Equity $7.5
Other loans $58.5
Total $97.5 Total $97.5
Suppose that the central bank comes to Bank 1’s rescue 
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sources (Chart 1). Accounting rules 
dictated that the securitized notes 
appear on Northern Rock’s balance 
sheet.7 Unlike the short-term asset-
backed commercial paper at the heart 
of the subprime crisis in the U.S., 
these notes had relatively long maturi-
ties, averaging about three and a half 
years.8
The Northern Rock run started 
with a nonrenewal of its short- and 
medium-term wholesale borrowing. 
When the Bank of England announced 
it would rescue Northern Rock, retail 
customers started withdrawing deposits 
as well. Some queued at branches to 
demand their deposits, while others 
struggled to access the bank’s website 
to withdraw funds.9 
Snapshots of Northern Rock’s lia-
bilities before and after the run show 
one striking change—the loan from the 
Bank of England (Chart 2). The loan 
amounted to about a quarter of total 
liabilities in December 2007. Moreover, 
both wholesale and retail funding 
declined to less than half of what they 
were before the run.
In the first half of 2008, the com-
position of Northern Rock’s liabilities 
saw little change. Retail deposits recov-
ered a bit after the government guar-
anteed deposits, and the bank repaid 
part of the Bank of England loan.
Capital and Leverage at 
Northern Rock. On the eve of the 
crisis, Northern Rock was complying 
with its capital requirements. In fact, it 
had excess capital. On June 29, 2007, 
the mortgage lender received approval 
from its regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority, to switch to the 
Basel II advanced approach and calcu-
late risk weights for its assets using the 
bank’s internal models. This resulted 
in a 45 percent decline in total risk-
weighted assets. According to the 2007 
interim report, Northern Rock’s risk 
weights for residential mortgages were 
reduced to the mid-teens. 
Northern Rock suddenly found 
itself with excess capital. In December 
2006, the capital ratio was 11.6 per-
cent under Basel I calculations, but it 
Chart 2
Wholesale Creditors and Retail Depositors Run on the Rock
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SOURCE: Northern Rock annual and interim reports, 2007–08.
Chart 1
Northern Rock Relied Increasingly on Nonretail Funding
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jumped to 17.5 percent under Basel II 
(Chart 3). By June 2007, the Basel II 
capital ratio had risen to 18.2 percent, 
well above the bank’s regulatory and 
internal requirements.
Not foreseeing the storms on the 
horizon, Northern Rock announced a 
30 percent increase in its interim divi-
dend, scheduled to be paid in October 
2007. However, losses incurred after 
June 2007 led to a deterioration of 
the bank’s equity, and its capital ratio 
declined to a record low of 10.2 per-
cent in mid-2008. The dividend was 
canceled.10
One problem with Northern Rock 
was its high leverage: It relied heavily 
on debt to finance its assets. 
Leverage is procyclical—high in 
booms and low in downturns. In good 
times, investors are willing to lend 
more per dollar of bank equity, allow-
ing banks to increase their leverage.
When economic and financial 
conditions turn sour, however, inves-
tors demand a larger equity cushion to 
protect themselves from losses. Banks 
find themselves needing to delever-
age—that is, cut their debt. Some 
institutions adjust their balance sheets 
by raising new equity or selling assets 
to repay some debt. Northern Rock 
wasn’t one of them. 
Leverage, the ratio of total assets 
to equity, can be calculated using 
alternative equity measures. Common 
equity is held by bank owners with 
voting power. Shareholder equity is 
common equity plus preferred shares. 
For Northern Rock, leverage on both 
common and shareholder equity were 
already high when they spiked after 
mid-2007 (Chart 4). 
Financial experts favor common 
equity when computing banks’ lever-
age.11 By this measure, Northern Rock’s 
leverage was 58.2 as of June 2007. It 
jumped to 86.5 by the end of the year 
in response to equity losses, and it was 
even higher in mid-2008. These figures 
are large by U.S standards: Leverage of 
U.S. investment banks, for example, is 
around 25 or 30.12 
Securitized notes are part of the 
Chart 3
Northern Rock’s Capital Ratio Was Above the 8 Percent 
Regulatory Minimum
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Chart 4
Leverage at Northern Rock Was Sky High
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Northern Rock balance sheet, and this 
leads to higher measures of leverage. 
Even if the securitized notes were off 
the balance sheet, leverage on com-
mon equity would still have been 
high: about 35 in June 2007, 52 at 
the end of that year and about 100 in 
June 2008. The high leverage made 
Northern Rock vulnerable to reduc-
tions in funding—an unsettling posi-
tion for a bank that complied with its 
capital requirements.
Strengthening Bank Regulation
The run on Northern Rock raises 
important questions about how to 
revise banking regulation. As it stands, 
the international standard embodied 
in Basel II has a few shortcomings. 
Among them is that capital regula-
tion exacerbates economic downturns 
because banks choose to curtail lend-
ing when capital is scarce.13 
Ideally, bank regulation seeks 
to balance two opposing objectives: 
reducing the cost of bank defaults 
and ensuring efficient lending. As a 
result, in a downturn, when banks are 
capital-constrained, it is desirable to 
adjust both. However, Basel standards 
require that the probability of bank 
defaults be fixed over time. When eco-
nomic conditions turn sour, lending 
bears the brunt. 
A proposed solution involves 
allowing slightly higher bank default 
probabilities in a downturn. This 
would mean that as the risk of an 
asset goes up, the capital the bank 
is required to hold against that asset 
won’t rise as sharply as it does now.14 
Recent events show that risk-
based capital measures may be inad-
equate for promoting stability of the 
financial system. Proposals to mitigate 
this problem include complementing 
the rules on bank capital with rules on 
liquidity and leverage.15 The rationale 
for liquidity regulations is that banks 
with more liquid assets or stable, illiq-
uid liabilities are less vulnerable in the 
face of a run. A leverage constraint 
would limit the amount of debt a bank 
can take on during booms and thus 
reduce the need to deleverage in bad 
times.16
Under a different regulatory 
scheme, Northern Rock might not 
have experienced the run that led to 
its collapse. If future regulations limit 
spillover effects among banks, they 
could reduce the chances for financial 
crises and the resulting damage to 
economies.
Cociuba is a research economist in the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas’ Globalization and 
Monetary Policy Institute.
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